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 THE PROBLEM OF DIRTY HANDS
 Leslie Griffin
 ABSTRACT
 This essay examines what Sartre called the problem of "dirty hands" as it
 applies to two issues in contemporary Catholic discussions of political
 morality. Beginning with Michael Walzer's work on dirty hands, the essay
 next identifies four approaches to this problem characteristic of Christian
 ethics. These four categories are then applied to analysis of two issues:
 conflicts of conscience that may confront Catholic politicians as a result of
 the responsibilities of public office and the church's exclusion of clergy and
 religious from holding public office.
 In his play, Dirty Hands, Jean-Paul Sartre juxtaposes two men with
 conflicting views of political life. Hoederer, the party's chief, desires power
 to help him attain his party's goals and will use any available means to
 attain his ends. The man who plans to assassinate him, Hugo, is sickened
 by what he perceives as treachery in Hoederer 's actions, for Hugo views
 Hoederer's double-dealing tactics as a compromise of the purity of the
 party's position. Their discussion throughout Sartre's play is instructive
 about the nature of political morality, but one statement by Hoederer to
 Hugo is particularly illuminating:
 How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil your
 hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did you join us? Purity
 is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois anarchists
 use it as a pretext for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain motionless,
 arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, / have dirty hands. Right up to
 the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood.
 And he leaves Hugo with the question that continues to plague phi-
 losophers, theologians and politicians - the so-called problem of dirty
 hands - "Do you think you can govern innocently?" (Sartre, 1949:222-25).
 While Hugo and Hoederer may not be helpful exemplars of political
 choice in the current North American context, contemporary discussions
 about political morality in the United States demonstrate that Hoederer's
 question remains problematical. For the situations which the politician
 confronts daily - the deployment of military or police force, or the dis-
 31
This content downloaded from 131.216.14.2 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 18:31:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 32 The Journal of Religious Ethics
 semination or withholding of information to the public, for example -
 provoke serious questions about the possibility of moral action by the
 politician. A further complication is added when politicians subscribe to
 religious beliefs which influence their moral outlooks and their political
 choices.
 In recent years, the problematical relationship among political, reli-
 gious and moral commitments has been quite evident in the controversies
 surrounding certain prominent Roman Catholic politicians. Two major
 issues have confronted those interested in the relationship between Roman
 Catholicism and political morality. The first of these involves the con-
 sciences of Catholic politicians (like Mario Cuomo and Geraldine Ferraro)
 who seek to combine Catholic faith with public office. The second of these
 concerns the exclusion of Roman Catholic clergy (like Robert Drinan) and
 religious from political office.
 My argument in this essay is that contemporary Catholic discussions of
 these two subjects can profit from a careful analysis of what philosophers
 and theologians, in response to Sartre's play, have entitled the "problem of
 dirty hands." My focus here will be on discussions of political morality in
 Christian ethics. In particular, after a brief discussion of Michael Walzer's
 work on dirty hands, I will identify four approaches to the problem of dirty
 hands characteristic of Christian ethics. I will argue that careful reflection
 on the differences in these approaches can shed some light on current
 Roman Catholic discussions of the morality of individual politicians and
 on the exclusion of priests and religious from political office and can
 provide some clear guidelines for a Roman Catholic political ethic.
 MICHAEL WALZER AND THE PROBLEM OF DIRTY HANDS
 In his article, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Michael
 Walzer (1978) (in response to an ongoing discussion among R. B. Brandt,
 R. M. Hare, and Thomas Nagel)1 identifies three possible resolutions of
 the problem of dirty hands, one of which he supports. As the basis for his
 interpretation of this problem, Walzer proposes three understandings of
 rules and moral actions. Walzer rejects the first two as inadequate and
 supports the third.
 The first view of moral rules is that they do not exist. Persons must
 overcome their personal inhibitions toward certain types of action, but
 there are no actions which are outlawed. The morality of every action is
 determined by its circumstances and consequences. The decision-maker
 can make mistakes, but cannot commit crimes. Walzer rejects this under-
 standing of morality; humans are, he says, situated in a social context in
 their decision-making, which provides them with rules: "Moral life is a
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 social phenomenon, and it is constituted at least in part by rules, the
 knowing of which ... we share with our fellows" (Walzer, 1978:107).
 Walzer parts company as well with those who argue the second posi-
 tion, that moral rules are summary rules, helpful guidelines about past
 experience, which can be overridden in cases (of one's own choosing) to
 which they do not apply. The fact that persons defend themselves when
 they break the rules, Walzer says, shows that rules have some prior status.
 The insistence on this prior status leads Walzer to propose a third
 understanding of rules, i.e., that when humans break rules they know they
 have done something wrong, even if their action was the best thing to do
 under the circumstances. In other words, humans experience guilt. Rules,
 then, are important, and guilt serves a useful purpose in preventing per-
 sons from breaking the rules too easily. Guilt also shows that persons are
 "good," in that they regret having to undertake certain actions. Walzer's
 belief in rules and in the guilt attached to breaking rules causes him to
 support the idea of dirty hands (that is, that the politician cannot remain
 innocent, cannot "keep her hands clean").
 Walzer links his analysis of moral rules to certain philosophical and
 theological predecessors. He identifies three strands of thinking about the
 problem of dirty hands: neoclassical, Protestant and Catholic. The first
 category is represented by Machiavelli. Machiavelli had moral standards,
 states Walzer, because he recognized that some actions are good and some
 bad. The goal of Machiavelli's leader, however, is to "learn how not to be
 good," and how to work for the best pragmatic results. Efficiency out-
 weighs morality. The problem with this neoclassical view, according to
 Walzer, is that the Machiavellian hero has no "inwardness," that is, no
 state of anguish or guilt about his behavior. Humans think that such a
 politician should show signs of guilt, says Walzer.
 In Walzer's second category, represented by Max Weber's tragic hero,
 the politician is indeed in anguish. Weber's politician is a suffering servant
 who is doomed by his political vocation. He must choose politics over
 love. He knows that he is damned, that God cannot justify his acts.
 Nevertheless, he must act as a politician. The problem with this Protestant
 category, states Walzer, is that Weber's suffering servant is either a mas-
 ochist or a hypocrite. His punishment and his guilt remain too individual,
 too self-inflicted. Walzer thinks citizens want the politician to be responsi-
 ble to some kind of social punishment; he also believes that we do not
 want to be governed by a politician who has lost her soul.
 Walzer thinks the third category is the most effective of the three in
 dealing with the problem of dirty hands. The representative of this Catho-
 lic position is Albert Camus. Camus' "just assassins" undertake their
 crime, but they are prepared to be punished for their actions. Walzer finds
 this a satisfactory condition for their action, for it requires an appropriate
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 punishment to fit the crime which has taken place. The Machiavellian has
 no one to control him; the Weberian has only herself. But in the third
 model society exists to punish the politician. Once she has undergone the
 penalty, her hands are clean again. Punishment is enforced to guard
 politicians against breaking the rules too easily. "They override the rules
 without ever being certain that they have found the best way to the results
 they hope to achieve, and we don't want them to do that too quickly or too
 often. So it is important that the moral stakes be very high - which is to
 say, that the rules be rightly valued" (Walzer, 1978: 120). 2
 Part of Walzer's acceptance of the concept of dirty hands is based on his
 belief that political action is different from behavior in the private sector
 for three reasons. The first of these is that the politician acts in the name of
 others (the citizens whom she governs) but that she also acts on her own
 behalf. The tension between these responsibilities makes political deci-
 sion-making difficult and complex. Second, politicians are subject to the
 pleasures of ruling. The third characteristic is that politicians have the
 potential to enforce their decisions and even to use violence, if they so
 wish.
 Illustrative of Walzer's opinions about political morality is a test case he
 constructs. Should a politician committed to establishing peace and order
 use torture to find out the location of bombs planted by a rebel leader?
 Torture, in Walzer's view, is the right decision, but "When he ordered the
 prisoner tortured, he committed a moral crime and he accepted a moral
 burden. Now he is a guilty man." But guilt is the only sign "that he is not
 too good for politics and that he is good enough. Here is the moral
 politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral
 man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician
 and nothing else, he would pretend that they were clean" (Walzer, 1978:
 105).
 In his suggestive conclusion, Walzer asserts that "we might see to it
 that fewer lies were told if we contrived to deny power and glory to the
 greatest liars - except, of course, in the case of those lucky few whose
 extraordinary achievements make us forget the lies they told" (Walzer,
 1978:120).
 In a later book, Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer adverts to his earlier
 treatment of dirty hands when he identifies the "supreme emergency"
 criteria of his just war theory. Walzer argues (1977:254) that supreme
 emergencies "bring us under the rule of necessity (and necessity knows no
 rules)." In supreme emergencies, the decision-maker might be required to
 override the important principle of non-combatant immunity. But in doing
 so one must "accept the burdens of criminality" (1977:260), "acknowledge
 that one has also been forced to kill the innocent" (1977:261), and admit
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 that this "is a kind of blasphemy against our deepest moral commitments"
 (1977:263).
 In the last chapter of this book, Walzer explores the morality of the men
 and women - the military and political leaders - who violate non-combat-
 ant immunity out of necessity. And Walzer argues - as he did in his dirty
 hands article - both that we want to have leaders who will do what is
 necessary and that we cannot ignore the horrors of what they do:
 The deliberate killing of the innocent is murder. Sometimes, in conditions of
 extremity . . . commanders must commit murder or they must order others
 to commit it. And then they are murderers, though in a good cause. In
 domestic society, and particularly in the context of revolutionary politics, we
 say of such people that they have dirty hands. I have argued elsewhere that
 men and women with dirty hands, though it may be the case that they have
 acted well and done what their office required, must nonetheless bear a
 burden of responsibility and guilt. (Walzer, 1977:323)
 As an instance of such guilt, Walzer describes the case of Arthur
 Harris, commander of the British Bomber Command in England in the
 Second World War, who was not honored by his country after the war.
 Even though Harris' bombing was necessary, Walzer agrees that it is
 important not to offer him public praise or recognition: "a nation fighting a
 just war, when it is desperate and survival itself is at risk, must use
 unscrupulous or morally ignorant soldiers; and as soon as their usefulness
 is past, it must disown them" (1977:325).
 Leaders, Walzer argues, cannot ask their citizens to be proud of such
 tactics. Supreme emergency, then, provides an apt illustration of Michael
 Walzer's understanding of the dirty hands of the politician.
 While Walzer's categories present a helpful analysis of the problem of
 dirty hands and remind us of the importance of the discussion of rules to
 questions of political morality, it seems to me that his "Protestant" and
 "Catholic" categories do not fairly represent the theological responses
 characteristic of Protestantism and Catholicism. Nor are his categories
 sufficient for Christians struggling with issues of personal conscience and
 public morality. I think that one can identify four, not two, characteristic
 approaches to the morality of politicians in the Christian tradition. Each
 includes a distinctive description of the moral life and of moral norms. I
 entitle the four positions moral purity, moral anguish, dual morality, and
 common morality.3
 These four positions represent different ways of thinking about the
 morality of the politician. To illustrate the moral reasoning characteristic
 of these four approaches, I have chosen certain authors I find representa-
 tive of these types of argument. At times, in my treatment of these writers,
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 I have limited my analysis to only one of their works. I recognize that
 other writings might place an author in a different location, and some
 writers could be described as representative of more than one category.
 My aim, however, is not to place authors in models, but to illuminate
 different arguments, different ideas, or different ways of speaking about
 the morality of the politician.
 Such a project inevitably encounters the limitations of any attempt to
 link specific authors to specific types of argument. Nonetheless, I do think
 that the categories themselves can be helpful to a general discussion of the
 morality of the politician in Christian ethics. And, in particular, in this
 article I will argue that they shed light on contemporary Roman Catholic
 discussions about politics and ethics.
 MORAL PURITY4
 My first model can be understood as offering primarily a deontological
 approach to ethics. This deontological argument rules out certain ac-
 tivities as inappropriate for the politician. In doing so, it argues that there
 is one morality available to all Christians, and there is no separate moral-
 ity applicable to politicians only. This one morality which rules out certain
 activities for all Christians may be ineffective or effective, but it argues that
 efficacy is not what should determine one's moral choices. To use the
 terminology of Walzer, the moral purity model argues that one should, as a
 Christian, keep one's hands clean.5
 The moral reasoning of this category is the type illustrated in Au-
 gustine's (1975) prohibition against lying in his treatises "On Lying" and
 "Against Lying," (but certainly not demonstrated in all of Augustine's
 moral arguments, e.g., on just war). For Augustine, lying is always wrong,
 no matter what circumstances surround it. Although he admits that there
 are times when other duties seem to overrule the necessity of telling the
 truth, he refuses to accept the force of these arguments. He stands firm in
 his belief that lying cannot be permitted. Some lies are more serious than
 others, but they are all wrong. Augustine would not care if beneficial
 political activities were aided by the lie, for his concern is for the eternal
 welfare of the soul of the individual who chooses to lie. For Augustine, no
 temporal benefit can justify an activity which can, by its very nature, harm
 one's immortal soul.6
 One of the clearest contemporary formulations of this first model's
 perspective on Christian ethics is found in John Howard Yoder's (1964)
 espousal of pacifism, of an ethic of non-resistance.7 At the heart of Yoder's
 ethic is what one could refer to as a deontological model (although he
 himself would resist that language, or at least say that such language was
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 not a sufficient description of his position), for it is fundamentally rooted
 in obedience and in absolute fidelity to Jesus Christ. Followers of Jesus
 Christ should learn about their ethic by looking to the behavior of Jesus
 himself; for Christian ethics must "be rooted in revelation, not alone in
 speculation, nor in a self-interpreting 'situation'" (Yoder, 1972:239; see
 alsoYoder, 1984:116).
 Focusing on this life of Jesus Christ provides Yoder with (at least) an
 ethic of non-resistance.8 Yoder establishes a negative norm against violent
 resistance grounded in the example of Jesus Christ. Jesus faced in his life
 the temptation of using violent means to bring about political change. But
 he rejected them, as should his followers. Yoder argues, "If Christ is who
 the texts say he is, no one gathering around him can affirm a mandate to
 kill or to oppress" (Yoder, 1984:118; cf. Yoder, 1972:98-100; 1964:44).
 Because of his insistence on obedience to Jesus Christ, Yoder rejects a
 so-called "ethics of responsibility" which argues for greater participation
 in politics for Christians, including possible use of violence. Such ethics
 arose in Christianity during the Constantinian era, he argues, and possess
 two major characteristics. First, they strive for universality; second, they
 are concerned with consequences or with effectiveness. These dual con-
 cerns distort the true Christian ethic, according to Yoder. For in making
 the ethic applicable to all persons, one loses the specific content of
 Christian ethics which obligates all Christians to obedience. And, in
 accepting effectiveness as a goal, Christians allow themselves to compro-
 mise with evil, to accept "lesser evils" in a way that Jesus did not. The
 cross, after all, does not testify to an ethic of efficacy.
 This should not lead one to conclude that Yoder concedes that his own
 ethic is ineffective. Rather, he argues in a number of his writings that his
 ethic of obedience could be effective.9 But that is not why Christians
 choose obedience. They choose it because they wish to be faithful to Jesus
 Christ.
 Two final points merit our attention for the problem of dirty hands.
 First, Yoder insists (n.d.: 31-33) that his own description of a Christian
 social ethic (and the sectarian tradition in general) has been caricatured as
 an ethic of irresponsibility and as one which advocates total withdrawal
 from society. But Yoder never, in fact, advocates that Christians be totally
 removed from society or from politics. For example, Christian participa-
 tion in the nation's policing forces could be accepted, or some active
 involvement in the legislative and elective processes, if the legislator
 could avoid being an "agent of power" (Yoder, 1964:27), could be permit-
 ted. But here again, participation is limited - or better bounded - by obe-
 dience to Jesus Christ. It is Jesus who provides the model for this type of
 involvement, for he avoided both extremes of political activity. He neither
 withdrew from political responsibility nor allied himself with the con-
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 servative order; he avoided "both quietism and establishment respon-
 sibility" (Yoder, 1972:98).
 Second, Yoder argues that Christian ethics has focused too narrowly on
 the morality of the ruler or of the politician; Christian social ethics has
 become an analysis of what people in power should do. Yoder argues that
 this is the wrong paradigm for Christian ethics. Christian social ethics
 should not require us to imagine ourselves in the place of the politician, to
 envision what she or he should do, and then to vote accordingly. Christian
 social ethics must not undertake a "What would you do if you were Henry
 Kissinger?" (Yoder 1984:162; see also Yoder, 1984:138; 1972:157) process.
 For the place of the Christian is with the oppressed. And so the paradigm
 for the Christian is to place herself with the powerless and the poor. The
 Christian ethic should be one not of dominion, but of service and ser-
 vanthood.
 Too much focus on the politician's dirty or clean hands, therefore, will
 shift Christian attention from the community and the community's calling
 to be ever critical of the state, of political life, and of political institutions.
 MORAL ANGUISH
 The second response to the dilemma of dirty hands, which I call the
 "moral anguish" model, differs from the first model in a number of ways.
 It argues that there are two moralities, one for the private individual and
 one for the politician (or more precisely, one morality and one immor-
 ality). It urges as well that action undertaken in the political arena should
 be responsible, i.e., effective (and suggests that backers of the first model
 are irresponsible, so concerned with moral purity that they accomplish
 nothing). Its approach to ethics in the sphere of politics is con-
 sequentialist. To be responsible, the politician must do what is necessary
 to bring about the best ends, but these actions are frequently immoral.
 Nonetheless, the politician must undertake these immoral actions, but she
 is guilty (i.e., her hands are dirty) when she does so. And politicians must
 be willing to pay the price - whether through internal guilt or external
 punishment - for these transgressions.10
 As Walzer notes, Max Weber's essay, "Politics as a Vocation," presents
 a striking example of the arguments of this category. Weber describes the
 conflict between the realm of the saint and the realm of the politician, and
 he contrasts an ethic of ultimate ends with an ethic of responsibility. In the
 ethic of ultimate ends, Weber believes one is concerned only with the
 purity of her own morals. Weber supports an ethic of responsibility for the
 politician, who must choose "morally dubious means or at least dan-
 gerous ones," all the while "facing the possibility or even the probability
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 of evil ramifications" (Weber, 1958:121). For all those who engage in
 politics must recognize that they open themselves to the influence of
 "diabolic forces."
 He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not
 seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics
 can only be solved by violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in an
 inner tension with the god of love, as well as with the Christian God as
 expressed by the church. This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcil-
 able conflict (Weber, 1958:126).
 Weber commends Machiavelli's agent who chooses the welfare of his city
 over the welfare of his own soul. The choice to be immoral in public life is
 a tragic, but necessary, one, for in making it the individual loses all hope of
 salvation. Politics is a vocation, but the politician is not called by God.
 Instead, Weber's hero chooses his own fate. He chooses politics and turns
 away from love. 1 1
 One theologian whose work illustrates this type of approach to ethics is
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer - at least the post-Cost of Disciple ship Bonhoeffer,
 the Bonhoeffer of the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler (for a different view
 of Bonhoeffer's decision, see Goldberg, 1986:3-4). Bonhoeffer's focus
 here is not, strictly speaking, the problem of dirty hands, since he is
 concerned with the actions of those plotting to overthrow a government
 rather than with the actions of politicians themselves. Nonetheless, his
 description of Christian ethics can help us to comprehend the vision of
 Christian ethics representative of the second model.12
 Bonhoeffer centers his ethic on Jesus Christ and on the need for the
 Christian to listen to the divine command of God through Jesus Christ.
 But Bonhoeffer does not understand obedience to Jesus Christ as cen-
 tered in the adherence of the individual to certain moral norms. In fact, the
 claim of Jesus Christ upon us "comes to us from without" (Bonhoeffer,
 1955:218; see also Rasmussen, 1972) and does not allow Christians to set
 up a system of moral absolutes.
 Instead, Bonhoeffer urges Christians to pursue an ethic of respon-
 sibility, a responsibility in which humans act in freedom and in which
 "obligation assumes the form of deputy ship and of correspondence with
 reality" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:227). Responsibility and deputyship mean that
 Christians cannot think of themselves as isolated individuals, but must be
 concerned with the well-being of others, as Jesus was. Bonhoeffer also
 urges (1955:227) that Christian responsibility cannot be "a matter of
 principle, but it arises with the given situation." Thus the Christian cannot
 be concerned with the development of systems of ethics, cannot concern
 herself with the pursuit of the "absolute good" but with the "relatively
 better" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:227). Not deontological norms or moral abso-
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 lutes, therefore, but instead a "contextualist ethic" (see Burtness, 1985,
 for discussion of this ethic).
 While Bonhoeffer allows for certain givens - the existence of the divine
 mandates, e.g., or the "generally accepted moral principles of the life of
 the state" which "no statesman can disregard . . . with impunity"
 (Bonhoeffer, 1955:237) - he also believes that extraordinary situations can
 arise. These kinds of cases cannot be settled by appeals to law but depend
 upon the free responsibility of the statesman to settle them - perhaps by
 breaking the law. For example, Bonhoeffer vehemently rejects Kant's
 absolute prohibition against lying, presenting instead a shifting, relative,
 contextual notion of what truth itself means (Bonhoeffer, 1955:363-72; cf.
 Burtness, 1985:126-63).
 Above all, the free and responsible agent is one who is willing to
 "accept guilt" (Bonhoeffer, 1955:240), i.e., one who does not worry about
 "being good," but focuses on loving the neighbor. As Jesus took the guilt
 of others upon himself, so must his followers. Bonhoeffer (1955:241)
 opposes the person who "sets his own personal innocence above his
 responsibility for men; . . . real innocence shows itself precisely in a man's
 entering into the fellowship of guilt for the sake of other men." This is the
 attitude Bonhoeffer describes in his Letters and Papers from Prison. In
 "After Ten Years," Bonhoeffer warns both against an ethic of duty and an
 ethic of virtuousness. He opposes an ethic of duty because "no one who
 confines himself to the limits of duty ever goes so far as to venture ... to
 act in the only way that makes it possible to score a direct hit on evil and
 defeat it." He opposes as well those who "flee from public altercation into
 the sanctuary of private virtuousness. But anyone who does this must shut
 his mouth and his eyes to the injustice around him. Only at the cost of self-
 deception can he keep himself pure from the contamination arising from
 responsible action" (Bonhoeffer, 1971:5).
 The descriptions of Bonhoeffer's actions by his biographers and by
 students of his thought illustrate this understanding of the Christian moral
 life. For example, Eberhard Bethge describes Bonhoeffer's rejection of
 pacifism: continued commitment to pacifism would endanger his co-con-
 spirators, and martyrdom for pacifism was a refusal to be involved with
 fellow Germans. Bethge argues that Bonhoeffer decided that it was "no
 longer a matter of keeping one's reputation clean as a Christian, a pastor
 and an individual, but of sacrificing everything, even one's reputation as a
 Christian" (Bethge, 1975:123). In Larry Rasmussen's analysis of Letters
 and Papers from Prison, he states that for Bonhoeffer, "While the man of
 private virtue refuses to dirty his hands in the public arena, injustice will
 roll on." And it is a process of dirtying one's hands, for "if in the process
 he becomes a martyr he will not be a saintly martyr but a guilty one"
 (Rasmussen, 1972:66, 52, my emphasis).
 Too much focus on personal obedience to Jesus Christ, therefore, will
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 shift Christian attention from its responsibility to the world and will allow
 the continuation of unjust political institutions.
 DUAL MORALITY
 The third model is similar to the second. Yet there are still differences
 significant enough, I think, to warrant distinguishing between them. The
 third response to the dilemma of dirty hands, like the second, is primarily
 consequentialist in its moral reasoning. It asserts as well that the public
 realm is subject, by its very nature, to moral regulations different from
 those of the private sphere. Therefore, there are two moralities, one for
 private life, and one for political life. Moral choice in the public sphere is to
 be directed toward the pursuit of effective consequences. What dis-
 tinguishes it from model two is that it fails to emphasize the guilt of the
 politician because of its emphasis on a second or different morality. The
 politician's hands are dirty, but she is nonetheless not guilty. Adherents of
 the third model wonder how the individual can be required to do some-
 thing for which she will be judged guilty. They ask as well how the
 individual can be punished, either internally or externally, for something
 required by life in the political realm.
 Walzer's discussion of Machiavelli provides some guidance about the
 parameters of this category, but also some instructive differences about
 the limits which prevent this theological category from being strictly
 Machiavellian. In The Prince and the Discourses, Niccolo Machiavelli
 rejects the belief that the ruler must obey moral laws. Instead, he teaches
 that the good ruler is a man of virtu - of strength, courage and cunning.
 Machiavelli 's prince is a ruler who governs with practical efficiency. His
 goal is not to follow moral rules, but to provide for the best interests of his
 state. One must be careful to recognize that Machiavelli does not abolish
 the idea of morality. He still believes in a moral code for the individual,
 that there are actions which are evil. But he does not believe that the ruler
 should be good.
 . . . [T]here is such a difference between the way we really live and the way
 we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will
 learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation. Any man who tries to be
 good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are
 not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his post must learn how not to
 be good, and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it, as necessity
 requires. (Machiavelli, 1977:44-45, my emphasis)
 Machiavelli does not believe that the moral code should be violated by
 the ruler on a whim or for the sake of cruelty. For Machiavelli, being
 immoral or cruel does not prove that one is a good ruler. Instead, immoral
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 actions are tools which the ruler is entitled to use without reproach if
 efficiency requires them and if good results verify their effectiveness.
 Machiavelli's prince is never judged by the morality or immorality of his
 actions, but by the effectiveness of his results. The shrewd ruler would
 recognize that frequent cruel actions can jeopardize the stability of his
 government by undermining his popularity.
 Thus, the ruler's success depends on whether cruelty is used well or badly.
 Cruelty can be described as well used (if it's permissible to say good words
 about something which is evil in itself) when it is performed all at once, for
 reasons of self-preservation; and when the acts are not repeated after that,
 but rather are turned as much as possible to the advantage of the subjects.
 Cruelty is badly used, when it is infrequent at first, but increases with time
 instead of diminishing. (Machiavelli, 1977:27; see also Shklar, 1984:30-35,
 for an analysis of Machiavelli, Montaigne and Montesquieu)
 What distinguishes Machiavelli from the theological proponents of a
 dual morality, I think, is the latter's attempt to place some limits on the
 sphere of public morality and on the goal of effectiveness. Martin Luther's
 writings illustrate in some ways this attempt and point as well to the
 difference I see between categories two and three. In A Short History of
 Ethics, Alasdair Maclntyre describes both Luther and Machiavelli as
 influential figures who contributed to the development of the "realm of
 secular power as having its own norms and justifications." Maclntyre
 (1966:127, 123-24) goes so far as to describe Machiavelli as the "Luther of
 secular power," arguing that Luther "bifurcated morality; there are on the
 one hand the absolutely unquestionable commandments, which are, so far
 as human reasons and desires are concerned, arbitrary and contextless,
 and on the other hand, there are the self-justifying rules of the political and
 economic order."
 Luther does sound "Machiavellian" with his insistence on two morali-
 ties, and does sound "Bonhoefferian"; his emphasis on human sinfulness
 may remind readers of category two. But I think that his acceptance of
 different standards for the public official and for the individual Christian,
 and his description of a two kingdoms theory place him in my theological
 model three. Martin Luther describes the world as divided into two
 kingdoms, both created by God and both good. One is the secular realm,
 and one is the spiritual realm. A different rule applies to each kingdom.
 The spiritual world is ruled by the Sermon on the Mount, while the secular
 world is ruled by the Mosaic Law. For Luther, the principles of the gospel
 do not have a social significance. But this does not mean that Christians
 should avoid participation in the secular world. Luther believes that the
 state is a necessary component of human life in which Christians must
 participate. At times, the function of the state requires actions that are not
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 acceptable to individual morality. The state does not and cannot act out of
 individual motives of love. For Luther, however, its official activities in
 pursuit of power can be justified (see Luther, 1961a).
 Luther argues (1961b:94), ". . . [O]ne must distinguish among men. For
 men can be classified either as public or private individuals." Public
 officials have a necessary function to judge and to punish evil men. Their
 deeds, even the killing of other humans, are justified because the public
 official acts as God's servant. In contrast, private individuals who desire
 vengeance must do so through the public representative of God.
 And yet, the Christian politician is not left without limits, cannot be left
 uninfluenced by the claims of individual morality. Luther urges the prince
 to service of the people, rather than domination. "In such manner should a
 prince in his heart empty himself of his power and authority and take unto
 himself the needs of his subjects, dealing with them as though they were
 his own needs. For this is what Christ did to us; and these are the proper
 works of Christian love" (Althaus, 1972:122). The importance of the
 influence of Christian love is evident as well in Luther's insistence on the
 need for ministers to preach to rulers about the word of God, reminding
 rulers that they must "subject themselves to the word of God" (Althaus,
 1972:147). For "the political office is limited not by the inherent indepen-
 dence of the ecclesiastical office but by the authority of the word of God"
 (Althaus, 1972:148). And the word of God, once again, always serves to
 remind the ruler that he should be of service.
 A contemporary representative of this model's separation between
 private and public spheres of morality is Reinhold Niebuhr, especially the
 Niebuhr of Moral Man and Immoral Society. In the opening paragraph of
 the book's introduction, Niebuhr claims: ". . . [A] sharp distinction must
 be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of
 social groups . . . This distinction justifies and necessitates political poli-
 cies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing"
 (Niebuhr, 1932:xi). Niebuhr bases his argument on the differences be-
 tween individuals and groups. Individuals are capable of sacrificing their
 own interests in order to work unselfishly for the welfare of other people.
 They can make conscious decisions to proceed altruistically and to control
 their inclinations to do otherwise. In contrast, individuals working within
 groups are confronted by the phenomenon of collective egoism. The
 group, unlike the individual, cannot guide and control its impulses and its
 selfish desires. The group, in order to reconcile the conflicting interests of
 the individuals who inhabit it, works for its own interests.
 It may be possible, though it is never easy, to establish just relations between
 individuals within a group purely by moral and rational suasion and accom-
 modation. In intergroup relations this is practically an impossibility. The
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 relations between groups must therefore always be predominantly political
 rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of
 power which each group possesses at least as much as by any rational and
 moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group. The
 coercive factors, in distinction to the more purely moral and rational factors,
 in political relations can never be sharply differentiated and defined.
 (Niebuhr, 1932:xxii)
 Niebuhr asserts the importance of two separate realms because of his
 perception of the realities of power. It is power which controls the secular
 and political world. It is those who have power who are able to abuse the
 rights of others and to commit injustices. Niebuhr believes that the only
 way in which this type of power can be thwarted is through the use of
 power.
 Because of the realities of power and of group relationships, the individ-
 ual who represents the collectivity is also allowed to determine his actions
 by standards other than those used by the individual in a non-public role.
 The politician is "the incarnation of a raison d'etat" (Niebuhr, 1978:10).
 Niebuhr provides two criteria for the politician's moral decision-making.
 First, do the proposed methods do justice to every human moral capacity?
 Second, do they take account of human limitations? Niebuhr opposes the
 idea of moral absolutes in the realm of political action. He considers no
 social policy, not even the use of violence, as intrinsically evil Instead, it is
 the consequences of the action which matter, and which must be carefully
 weighed and measured.
 The realm of politics is a twilight zone where ethical and technical issues
 meet. A political policy cannot be intrinsically evil if it can be proved to be
 an efficacious instrument for the achievement of a morally approved end.
 Neither can it be said to be wholly good merely because it seems to make for
 ultimately good consequences. Immediate consequences must be weighed
 against the ultimate consequences . . . whether the ultimate good, which is
 hoped to be accomplished by this immediate destruction, justifies the sacri-
 fice is a question which depends upon many considerations for its answer.
 (Niebuhr, 1932:171; see also, on Gandhi, Niebuhr, 1932: 240-56)
 Niebuhr insists on a relationship between public and individual moral-
 ity, although that relationship is frequently ambiguous. At one point, he
 argues that individual morality must be retained for its important influence
 on group morality. He claims that the two moralities are not mutually
 exclusive. The public official needs to have moral insights and to develop a
 moral outlook on her behavior, and the best source of this outlook is an
 individual morality. If the individual is to cultivate her own moral disci-
 pline while working in groups, some fusion between the two moralities is
 necessary.13
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 At the same time, however, Niebuhr insists that parts of the two ethics
 are irreconcilable. The two moralities do have a different focus, and
 individual morality must at times be disregarded.
 From the perspective of society, the highest moral ideal is justice. From the
 perspective of the individual the highest ideal is unselfishness. Society must
 strive for justice even if it is forced to use means, such as self-assertion,
 resistance, coercion and perhaps resentment, which cannot gain the moral
 sanction of the most sensitive moral spirit. (Niebuhr, 1932:257)
 Niebuhr claims that every attempt to transfer individual disinterestedness
 to group activities has failed. Because of this, a strong sense of religious
 idealism is not applicable to the realistic world of politics. Religious and
 political morality can never be equated, and the attempt to harmonize the
 morality of the two spheres destroys the effectiveness of both.
 Whenever religious idealism brings forth its purest fruits and places the
 strongest check upon selfish desire it results in policies which, from the
 political perspective, are quite impossible. There is, in other words, no
 possibility of harmonising the two strategists [sic] designed to bring the
 strongest inner and the most effective social restraint upon egoistic impulse.
 It would therefore seem better to accept a frank dualism in morals than to
 attempt a harmony between the two methods which threatens the effec-
 tiveness of both. (Niebuhr, 1932:271, my emphasis)
 Thus, although Niebuhr makes an effort to link public and private moral-
 ity, his overall emphasis is on the dualism of the two worlds.
 How does this ethic relate to Christianity, and what prevents it from
 being entirely a "Machiavellian" ethic? Niebuhr retains, first of all, a
 concern for the influence of individual morality upon social morality. What
 is significant for Niebuhr as well is his retention of love as well as justice in
 his ethic. WTiile all humans can hope to achieve in this world is justice, the
 importance of love is never denied. Love remains as an "impossible
 possibility" offering the chance of limitation on certain human actions.
 WTiat remains frequently unclear in Niebuhr's writings, of course, is how
 these bounds are known, and how they are established (see Niebuhr,
 1976:232-37).
 A passage from Richard Fox's biography of Reinhold Niebuhr illus-
 trates this difference between the theological model of Martin Luther and
 Reinhold Niebuhr and the neoclassical model of Michael Walzer. Fox
 describes Niebuhr's opposition to the 1962 senate campaign of Edward
 Kennedy and to John Kennedy's "sexual capers" while president. Fox
 argues that Niebuhr was opposed to these activities because
 there were firm - if ill-defined - limits to Niebuhr's realism. The responsible
 statesman did have to dirty his hands in the pursuit of justice. But without
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 personal probity a politician lost sight of justice, which was the social
 correlate of individual fair-dealing. Kennedy's cynicism was Machiavellian,
 not Niebuhrian. Niebuhr frequently had to insist that his secular admirers
 were turning his realism into a world-weary manipulativeness that verged on
 moral nihilism. (Fox, 1985:277, my emphasis)
 When Hans Morgenthau, according to Fox, doubted that "one could be
 both 'a successful politician and a good Christian,'" Niebuhr corrected
 him:
 The Christian politician was the one who engaged in the statesmanlike
 compromises that a sinful world demanded, but who relentlessly subjected
 his actions to the test of the standard of justice. The Christian leader made
 use of the world's methods but did not resign himself to the world's ways. He
 cultivated an uneasy conscience - not merely a matter of breast-beating but
 of real self-criticism. His career was a perennial struggle, personal and
 political, to bring justice to bear in human relations. Politics was therefore
 not Morgenthau's realm of "amorality," but a sphere of "moral ambiguity."
 (Fox, 1985:277; see also Frankel, 1978; Olafson, 1973)
 Moral ambiguity and a dual morality - and yet not, I think, the moral
 anguish illustrated in the second category.
 COMMON MORALITY
 My fourth and final category is the common morality position. The
 fourth model argues that there is one morality for the private citizen and
 for the politician. It can, like the first model, include a deontological
 argument that prohibits certain actions as intrinsically evil. Unlike the first
 model, however, it allows for the possibility of compromise with evil. It
 admits that there are times in which the public official must undertake
 seemingly evil actions - killing, punishment, torture, lying, the use of
 violence - but so must the private individual. It argues that the politician
 can be both moral and effective, but that there are limits to the goal of
 efficacy. We have seen that there could be such limits in category three,
 but the common morality position establishes these limits more precisely.
 And because this model offers an ethical system which can respond to the
 moral dilemmas of both the private citizen and the public official, it argues
 that the politician's hands can remain clean.
 One philosopher who responds explicitly to Walzer's argument is Alan
 Donagan, who in his The Theory of Morality rejects the concept of dirty
 hands as inconsistent with "common morality" - "the part of common
 morality according to the Hebrew-Christian tradition which does not
 depend on any theistic belief" (Donagan, 1977:29). 14 Donagan believes
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 that if separate moral rules exist for politicians, common morality has
 failed, and he argues against "the proposition that the political goods that
 matter, liberty, prosperity, and peace, can only be procured by courses of
 action which involve grave violations of common morality, if not in the use
 of power, then in its acquisition" (Donagan, 1977:184). Donagan rejects as
 well a consequentialist approach to the problem. He reminds his readers
 that the fact the good has resulted from evil actions does not mean that it
 could not also have resulted from good actions. "That good has come
 about through crime does not show that it could only have come about
 through crime" (Donagan, 1977:185). Donagan also believes that histo-
 rians and philosophers have concentrated on the good results of crime
 while neglecting all the long-range evil results.
 No philosophy of history has produced any evidence worth the name either
 that, in the long run, any great political good could only have come about
 through barbarous or oppressive means, or that the barbarous and op-
 pressive actions without which some political goods would not have come
 about have not also brought about compensating evils. (Donagan, 1977:185)
 As an example of his reasoning, Donagan argues that the evidence does
 not support a conclusion for torture in the case Walzer considers. The
 agent must first consider all other available options, such as an intensive
 search for the explosives. Even if finally the torture becomes expedient,
 Donagan claims that common morality can respond to this situation by
 asking if the prisoner satisfies the conditions for immunity to violence.
 Common morality can assert that this prisoner has violated his right to
 immunity from torture because he has endangered the lives of others. The
 morality which responds to private individuals can resolve this case; a
 separate public morality is unnecessary. "And so the problem of dirty
 hands dissolves. It arises from a twofold sentimentalization: of politics,
 imagining it as an arena in which moral heroes take hard (that is, immoral)
 decisions for the good of us all; and of common morality, ignoring the
 conditions it places on the immunities it proclaims" (Donagan, 1977:189;
 see also Howard, 1977; and see Little, 1978, for an argument against
 Niebuhr's two moralities).
 In the Christian tradition, an illustration of the arguments of the fourth
 model can be found in twentieth century Roman Catholic discussions of
 moral theology. Some sense of the argument proposed by this tradition
 can be gained from John XXIII's description of political life in Pacem in
 Terris.
 The same moral law which governs relations between individual human
 beings serves also to regulate the relations of political communities with one
 another.
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 This will be readily understood when one reflects that the individual repre-
 sentatives of political communities cannot put aside their personal dignity
 while they are acting in the name and interest of their countries; and that
 they cannot therefore violate the very law of their being, which is the moral
 law.
 It would be absurd, moreover, even to imagine that men could surrender
 their own human attributes, or be compelled to do so, by the fact of their
 appointment to public office. On the contrary, they have been given that
 noble assignment precisely because the wealth of their human endowments
 has earned them their reputation as outstanding members of the body
 politic.
 Furthermore, authority is a necessary requirement of the moral order in
 human society. It may not therefore be used against that order; the very
 instant such an attempt were made, it would cease to be authority.
 ... a fundamental factor of the common good is acknowledgement of the
 moral order and respect for its prescriptions (Gremillion, 1976:218-19, my
 emphasis).
 In this document, John XXIII does not provide the full argument which
 explains Roman Catholic understandings of political morality. But it is
 worth noting that Pacem in Terris is heavily dependent upon a natural law
 method, an approach highly favored in traditional Roman Catholic moral
 theology.
 Among the tools which permit John XXIII to argue as he does, and
 which persuade the Roman Catholic tradition of moral theology to allow
 individuals some moral compromise with evil, are two principles central to
 the tradition, the principle of double effect and the principle of coopera-
 tion. What these principles provide, in general, is a way of distinguishing
 between intrinsic evil (evil which can never be directly done, under any
 circumstances) and nonmoral or premoral or ontic evil (evil which can be
 allowed, if certain conditions are met) (for a discussion of these terms, see
 Curran and McCormick, 1979). The moral argumentation of this category
 thus allows - as the first category does - for absolute prohibitions in Chris-
 tian ethics - but it defines them differently, drawing the line in a different
 place.
 While I cannot rehearse at this point all of the arguments about contem-
 porary formulations and reformulations of the principles of double effect
 and cooperation based on new ways of understanding the concepts of
 intrinsic evil and proportionate reason, the classical statements of the
 principles are in themselves still helpful to our problem of dirty hands.
 What the principle of double effect argues is that sometimes human
 actions have two effects, one good and one evil. The causation of the evil
This content downloaded from 131.216.14.2 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 18:31:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Problem of Dirty Hands 49
 effect need not prohibit the moral agent from undertaking that action,
 providing certain conditions be met:
 1. The action, considered by itself and independently of its effects,
 must not be morally evil.
 2. The evil effects must not be the means of producing the good effect.
 3. The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated.
 4. There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in
 spite of its evil consequences. (Kelly, 1958:13-14)
 Closely related to the principle of double effect, and receiving less
 attention in the discussion of moral principles in contemporary Roman
 Catholic moral theology, is the principle most pertinent to our discussion,
 the principle of cooperation. Cooperation means "concurrence with an-
 other person in an act that is morally wrong" (Healy, 1956:101). The
 tradition distinguishes between "formal" and "material" cooperation with
 evil. Formal cooperation occurs when one
 1 . acts with another in performing an external act that is morally wrong
 in itself, or
 2. performs a morally indifferent act, but does so with the intention of
 helping another in a morally wrong action, and with the approval of
 the other's action. (Healy, 1956:102)
 One could never, of course, undertake an action that was intrinsically evil.
 On the other hand, material cooperation is "that in which, without
 approving another's wrongdoing, one helps him perform his evil action by
 an act which is not of its nature morally wrong" (Healy, 1956:103); it is
 "concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention
 with which it is done" (Slater, 1908:203). Material cooperation is permitted
 when one has a proportionate reason for so acting. For example, one could
 cooperate in a burglary, if the robber holds a gun to her head. The reason
 for this is that "charity does not impose an obligation when the cost or
 burden is out of proportion to the good that will result" (Healy, 1942:45);
 "charity does not bind with grave inconvenience" (Connell, 1953:93).
 Decisions about whether an action is permitted, once it is defined as
 material rather than formal cooperation, depend upon the discernment of
 what "proportionate reason" means. The discussion of material coopera-
 tion establishes criteria which could help one to decide if the cooperation
 were permitted. For example, it matters if the individual's action would be
 very proximate, less proximate, or remote relative to the evil deed. If the
 first, only very grave reasons would allow for cooperation; if the second,
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 grave reasons would suffice; if the third, slight reasons would be suffi-
 cient.15 The analysis is affected as well by the responsibilities accorded to
 one's station in life.
 This division of levels of cooperation and the difficulty of discerning
 which actions fell into which categories led Henry Davis to observe
 (1946:342), "Great varieties of opinion therefore, on any given case except
 the most obvious, are inevitable, and there is no more difficult question
 than this in the whole range of Moral Theology."
 Most of the explication of the meaning of formal and material coopera-
 tion occurs in case analysis; the conditions of cooperation are usually
 illustrated with examples. Many of these center on medical ethical ques-
 tions of cooperation with "evil" procedures and employees' participation
 in actions commanded by an employer (usually the servant commanded to
 undertake an "evil" action). But a number of the manuals do note that, in
 the political sphere, Catholic public officials could cooperate in the en-
 forcement of unjust laws, or could compromise with opponents in indif-
 ferent political matters, to bring about a good election or a good law. It is
 the principle of cooperation which helps explain, for example, "how a
 legislator can vote for a law which Catholic ethics might consider per-
 missive of an immoral action; how public authorities can execute such a
 law" (Dailey, 1970: 165). 16 In undertaking these actions, guided by formal
 and material cooperation, of course, politicians are always acting morally,
 with clean hands.
 Elements for such a "clean hands" approach to political morality can
 be found as well in the writings of the Catholic whose reflections on the
 United States political system so greatly influenced Roman Catholic po-
 litical theory. John Courtney Murray, too, depends on the natural law
 approach favored by Donagan, John XXIII, and the Roman Catholic
 tradition of moral theology, proclaiming indeed the "eternal return of
 natural law" (Murray, 1960:295).
 In an essay on morality and foreign policy, Murray argues that the
 problem with discussions about a moral foreign policy is that there is no
 agreement about what morality is. Murray rejects two theories of morality
 which he sees as characteristic of the American (and Protestant) debate
 and which are reminiscent of the models discussed above. The older
 morality was voluntarist, scriptural, individualistic, subjectivist, it offered
 absolute precepts and was based on a morality of intention. Its promotion
 of "Christian perfection as a social standard," Murray argues (1960:277),
 left it with "no resources for discriminating moral judgment" on political
 questions. The new morality which has replaced and rejected it is situa-
 tional, pragmatist, consequentialist; above all it sees moral life as ambigu-
 ous; it "teaches that to act is to sin, to accept responsibility is to incur
 guilt" (Murray, 1960:277-78).
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 Both moralities, according to Murray, pose three problems. First, they
 allow for a gulf between individual and collective morality. Second, they
 recognize that nations act out of self-interest, but condemn self-interest as
 immoral. Third (and most important for the problem of dirty hands),
 neither morality deals effectively with power.
 For Murray, the problem with American moral thought is that it views
 power as evil. Because of this, Americans have not wanted to make use of
 instruments of power (their "hands," for Murray). They have wanted to act
 with "clean" hands, but actually with no hands, since if power is always
 evil, any use of it involves the nation in guilt.
 We have never wanted to have such hands, much less to get them dirty by
 handling any history save our own. . . . Now we have become suddenly
 conscious of our hands - that they are sinewy beyond comparison; that they
 are sunk in the affairs of the world; that they are getting dirty beyond the
 wrists.
 At least we feel them to be dirty, and the feeling is one of guilt (Murray,
 1960:281).
 Possibilities for a morality of power are further weakened by those who
 argue that "to refuse to use power is to be 'irresponsible,' and therefore to
 be more guilty yet" (Murray, 1960:282).
 Murray rejects this moral language. He employs the analogy of a
 surgeon (an interesting choice, given the Roman Catholic tradition's heavy
 emphasis on medical questions to describe formal and material coopera-
 tion) to make his point. In the midst of surgery, a surgeon does not speak
 of paradox, irony, dilemma, or above all, of ambiguity, even if aspects of
 the surgery could be viewed as such. Instead, Murray argues that "compli-
 cated situations, surgical or moral, are merely complicated. It is for the
 statesman, as for the surgeon, to master the complications and minister as
 best he can to the health of the body, politic or physical" (Murray,
 1960:284).
 Murray rejects, therefore, the language of ambiguity, turning instead to
 the natural law tradition, the "tradition of reason" (Murray, 1960:285).
 That tradition can span the gap between individual and collective moral-
 ity; it can evaluate self-interest (in certain forms) as morally appropriate;
 and it can discern moral uses of power. It does so by teleological reason-
 ing which distinguishes between force and violence, for "force is morally
 neutral in itself" (Murray, 1960:288). Murray admits (1960:288) that the
 "casuistry is endlessly difficult," but the tradition of reason can nonethe-
 less resolve such problems.
 Clean hands are possible in the fourth category, therefore, for guilt does
 not attach to persons who undertake actions with proportionate reason,
 which permit some evil but which are not evil in themselves.
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 ROMAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL ETHICS: CLEAN AND DIRTY
 HANDS?
 What are the implications of the existence of these models for Christian
 ethics, and specifically for the contemporary discussion of political moral-
 ity in Roman Catholic moral theology? The most obvious point to make
 about them is that they remind us of the significant differences in ethical
 arguments proposed by different Christian writers and serve again to
 highlight the difficulty of finding points of agreement in Christian ethics.
 While some Christians hope that common ground in Christian ethics can
 be found in ethical practice, if not in ethical theory, the categories of
 response to the problem of dirty hands do not provide immediate hope of
 agreement in the sphere of action, for they differ not only in method, but in
 conclusions on substantive issues. The most striking of these, of course, is
 the contrast between the first model's absolute prohibition of violence and
 the allowance of violence by the other three. But even in their joint
 acceptance of the use of violence, the differences among the last three
 models could still result in different practices. To Niebuhr, for example (as
 for Walzer) it matters if the politician possesses some kind of "in-
 wardness," some type of personal morality - some commitment to the
 impossible ideal of love. For that might provide some restriction on her
 actions as a public official, restrictions which the second category might
 not provide. Again, recent debates among American Catholics about the
 morality of deterrence policy and of first use of nuclear weapons demon-
 strate that a stance which ultimately offers an absolute prohibition -
 against direct killing of the innocent - may differ significantly from an
 ethic which is primarily consequentialist in approach.
 Let me step back for a moment from these broader questions about
 Christian ethics to a more specific discussion of the implications of these
 models for Roman Catholic political morality. It seems to me, for example,
 that Roman Catholic politicians reckoning with abortion (the political
 issue receiving the most sustained debate in recent years by Roman
 Catholic politicians), but also with nuclear policy and questions of eco-
 nomic justice, need to reflect seriously on the distinctions between the
 moral anguish and common morality positions, and between the dual
 morality and the common morality positions. The common morality model
 rejects arguments that there is a split between private and public morality,
 that the politician is obliged by her office to do something immoral; in
 other words, it rejects the concept of dirty hands. It is difficult from within
 that position, therefore, to countenance language by Catholic politicians
 which suggests that their personal convictions contradict their public
 positions. Nor is it helpful when such politicians use language suggesting
 that they are obligated by their professional lives to undertake immoral
 actions which their personal consciences abhor (e.g., Cuomo, 1984; see
This content downloaded from 131.216.14.2 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 18:31:40 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Problem of Dirty Hands 53
 McBrien, 1987:133-68, for an analysis of the Cuomo and Ferraro state-
 ments).
 The common morality position, however, does not obligate politicians
 to vote for legislation with which they disagree, even on these difficult
 issues. Part of that is due to the fact that politicians need to exercise
 "prudential judgment" as legislators, a point well made by Mario Cuomo
 and others. But part of that "prudential judgment" requires a more de-
 tailed analysis of the classical principle of cooperation with evil. Part of
 the argument of that principle, of course, is the reminder that politicians
 are not necessarily guilty when they vote for a law with which they
 disagree. Backing that principle as well is an argument that both public
 and private individuals undertake processes of prudential judgment when
 they confront difficult problems in personal as well as professional life. The
 principles of cooperation and double effect are accessible to private indi-
 viduals as well as public representatives, and thus there cannot be two
 moralities.
 How can further reflection on cooperation with evil aid current discus-
 sions of political morality? First, for example, a major stumbling block in
 using the principle of cooperation to allow for votes supporting funding of
 abortion appears to be that direct abortion is defined as intrinsically evil.
 (In 1959, a different issue provoked a similar concern, when a Catholic
 moral theologian asked what type of cooperation would be involved if a
 Catholic president signed laws permitting contraceptive programs; see
 Connery, 1959:353-54.) But there is at present a great deal of questioning
 of the concept of intrinsic evil by Christian ethicists. That debate needs to
 be reflected in contemporary discussions and definitions of the difference
 between formal and material cooperation with evil.
 Second, for example, when the moral manuals present cases of material
 cooperation with evil (usually the nurse participating in a surgical pro-
 cedure), they frequently suggest the need for the person to express some
 disapproval of the action being undertaken, even if she does eventually
 cooperate with the procedure. Here the "I'm personally opposed to abor-
 tion but" language of a number of Catholic politicians could be subject to
 a more positive interpretation. That is, such language might not be il-
 lustrative of a dual morality, but might express the fact that certain
 political actions are undertaken as forms of material cooperation. Here
 also can be valued the conviction of some Catholic politicians (even those
 who vote for abortion funding) that they should work to remove the social
 conditions which make unwanted pregnancy possible and abortion desir-
 able. There is a positive moral interpretation, therefore, which can be
 placed on the language of personal opposition to the evils with which one
 is allowed to cooperate.
 However, if thoughtful Catholic politicians do continue to find in their
 experience that their private and public consciences contradict one an-
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 other, it may be that the "common morality" position so defended by
 Donagan and Murray, and so basic to the Roman Catholic tradition of
 moral theology, may not correspond to the reality of the public official's
 life. If common morality - the natural law approach- fails, then Roman
 Catholics face a profound question about their understanding of Christian
 ethics. They would need to ask themselves: do we need to remain moral,
 to keep our private consciences intact, by accepting the arguments of
 model one about political involvement? Or should we move to affirm the
 reality of what Dietrich Bonhoeffer or Reinhold Niebuhr stated about
 political life? The move toward another model could result not only in a
 new attitude toward Christian political morality but in different political
 practices as well. Ethicists need to learn at this point from the moral
 experience of politicians themselves.
 There is a second topic in contemporary Roman Catholic political
 ethics for which these categories possess interesting implications. That is,
 there are members of the Roman Catholic community who are prohibited
 from becoming politicians, namely, priests and members of religious com-
 munities. There are many reasons for this, and I cannot do full justice to
 the arguments surrounding this exclusion here.17 But the prohibition is
 interesting in relationship to the models which I have sketched. It would
 be easy, for example, to understand why priests and religious should not
 participate in the political life according to models two and three, for
 politics is a "dirty" business to the Niebuhrs and the Bonhoeffers of the
 tradition. On the fourth model, priests and members of religious commu-
 nities might need to cooperate with evil but could remain moral agents in
 their cooperation. However, even this is not permitted to them; they are
 regulated instead, it seems, by the framework of the first model. This is not
 surprising, since there is in the Catholic tradition a history of talking about
 two moralities, or at least two different callings in life, one of them guided
 by the counsels of perfection. There is precedent, for example, in thinking
 about the clerical life as sectarian within a church tradition. But that
 precedent should force Catholics to ask themselves how the perspectives
 of models one and four can be held together, with consistency. It should
 lead them to consider anew - and with serious attention - the claims of
 model one about political morality.
 We should remember, however, that while there are variations within
 the sectarian model itself, in theory it can allow for some participation in
 the political realm, if that participation can be regulated by the demands of
 obedience to Jesus Christ. What needs to be made clearer are the reasons
 why that level of participation should differ for clergy and for laity, since in
 Catholicism all participation in the political realm must be guided by
 fidelity to moral principles.
 There may be all kinds of legitimate reasons for the exclusion of priests
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 and members of religious communities from elective political office, rea-
 sons which we cannot examine here. There could be, for example, very
 practical reasons based on the shortage of priests and religious and the
 need to confine their activity to ecclesiastical functions. There are as well
 arguments from the counsels of perfection, arguments about the holiness
 of the lifestyle of priests and religious, or about the spiritual witness which
 they offer to church and world. Questions of competence and of church
 unity are significant as well.
 But the various answers to the problem of dirty hands, I think, force
 Catholics to be more precise about the morality of clergy and religious.
 What is it about the morality of religious life and of political life which
 brings the two into conflict? Does participation in political life, for exam-
 ple, violate the counsels of perfection? Is there a conflict between the
 duties of holiness and the duties of morality? Can one perhaps be a moral
 politician, but not a holy one? And if so, was Max Weber right to contrast
 the politician and the saint? If there are, in fact, two moralities within
 Catholic political ethics, what does that say about the validity of a natural
 law foundation for Christian ethics?
 At the heart of the Catholic tradition is an argument that persons in
 general - and politicians specifically - should not dirty their hands. But
 the contemporary descriptions by Catholic politicians of their political
 activity, and the exclusion of certain Catholics from elective political
 office, demonstrate that other models of analysis - models from other
 segments of the Christian tradition - are present in their arguments as
 well. Further clarity, therefore, about the morality of politics, and about
 the relationship between holiness and morality, is necessary before Catho-
 lics, in union with other Christians and with philosophers and politicians
 in general, can answer the question, "Can politicians be moral?"
 NOTES
 1. Walzer (1978), Nagel (1972), Brandt (1972), and Hare (1972) discuss
 whether or not a person could face a situation in which she must choose between
 two courses of action, both of which are wrong. That same question is implicit in
 the discussion of my categories. For further treatment of this "conflict of duties"
 question, see Kant, 1964; Gowans, 1987.
 2. Walzer's concern is similar to Bernard Williams' discussion of reluctance
 among politicians. Sometimes politicians must undertake actions that are morally
 disagreeable, but Williams argues that "... only those who are reluctant or
 disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much
 chance of not doing it when it is not necessary" (1978:64).
 3. For an informative philosophical analysis of attitudes toward politics which
 differs from Walzer's, see Langan, 1985:127:48.
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 It is important to note that Walzer et al. 's discussion of political morality is
 dependent on their assessment of moral rules. Christian ethicists discussing politi-
 cal morality should pay attention to the debate about rules and Christian love
 provoked by Fletcher, 1966, and discussed in, e.g., Ramsey, 1967, and Outka, 1972.
 One could attempt to link my own categories with those of pure-act agapism,
 summary rule agapism, pure rule agapism, and combinations of rule and act
 agapism. There are, e.g., some similarities between moral purity and pure rule;
 moral anguish and pure act; dual morality and summary rule; and common
 morality and combination. It would not be helpful, I think, to try to push the two
 categories together, and an attempt to do so would only confirm the weakness of
 typologies. What is important is to recognize that some understanding of the status
 of moral norms is central to each category.
 4. While some persons, including Hoederer, use the term "moral purity" in a
 pejorative sense, it should not be so interpreted here. The same caution applies to
 the use of the word "sectarian" to describe this position; "sectarian," as John
 Howard Yoder rightly notes, should be interpreted in its "non-pejorative technical
 sense" (1984:6).
 5. The image of clean and dirty hands is a problematical one for the Christian
 discussion of political morality. The acceptance of some degree of human sin-
 fulness in all four models makes it inexact to speak of totally "clean" hands. While
 it would be interesting to note the relationship between conceptions of sinfulness
 and the morality proposed in each of these models, I will not be able to focus on
 that topic in this article. And I will continue to employ the clean/dirty hands, using
 it to express not the sinfulness which attaches to human actions, but the moral
 guilt which attaches to the agent undertaking the activity. Gustafson, (1978),
 provides a helpful analysis of the different attitudes toward sin which characterize
 the Christian tradition. He demonstrates as well how the Roman Catholic tradi-
 tion, even with a concept of sinfulness, can allow for 1) moral guilt and moral
 innocence; and 2) the possibility of a morally good choice, even when the agent is
 confronted with her sinfulness (1978:7-10). The existence of differences of opinion
 among Christians about the relationship of sinfulness and moral guilt is crucial to
 my categories.
 6. The same absolute prohibition against lying is offered by Immanuel Kant,
 who, in a now infamous example, affirms that persons should not lie, even if the
 murderer standing on your doorstep asks if his victim is in your house, and you
 know that the victim is upstairs (Kant, 1978:285-90). Dietrich Bonhoeffer (one
 exemplar of my second model) responds specifically to Kant's treatment of the
 lying case.
 7. Yoder provides as well a very helpful analysis of the different outlooks
 toward the state in the Christian tradition.
 8. One should not let this description of Yoder's ethic camouflage the positive
 requirements of Christian life that he discusses throughout his work. See Yoder,
 1984:118; 1972:98-100; 1964:44.
 9. In his book, What Would You Do? (i.e., what would you do if someone
 attacked a member of your family), he describes a situation of physical attack in
 which it is possible that the ethic of non-resistance could bring about the best
 consequences. See Yoder, 1985.
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 10. Here, unlike Walzer, I combine internal guilt and external sanctions in one
 category. One of the reasons for this is that Walzer and I have different understand-
 ings of the Catholic position.
 11. Shklar calls into question the Machiavellian approach and the Weberian
 approach, arguing that the "simple choice that Weber inherited from Machiavelli
 between a mere two rules, immoral politics and moral privacy, does not make
 much sense in a liberal democratic state. . . . His [Weber's] were the politics of the
 great gesture, and they still appeal to those engaged intellectuals who like to think
 of 'dirty hands' as a peculiarly shaking, personal, and spectacular crisis. This is a
 fantasy quite appropriate to the imaginary world, in which these people see
 themselves in full technicolor. Stark choices and great decisions are actually very
 rare in politics" (Shklar, 1984:243).
 But Shklar's analysis shows as well the difficulties of the dirty hands categories,
 for while Shklar insists that one cannot completely separate out public from
 private morality - for "what we look for both in public officials and in our friends is
 character" - she argues that "as social actors, we all have unclean hands some of
 the time" (Shklar, 1984:243).
 12. I am indebted to Drew Christiansen S.J. for the choice of Bonhoeffer as a
 representative of this model.
 Another possible choice for this category might be Emil Brunner, who at times
 echoes the morality /immorality language of this category. At times, Brunner
 argues, the Christian must go against her conscience: "If the Christian's 'official
 duty' causes pain and perplexity to his conscience, it must simply be endured. The
 Divine Command is terribly distorted when difficulties of conscience created by
 the 'official order' are evaded by setting up a double morality" (Brunner, 1937:222,
 460-63).
 13. It is this same understanding of morality which is behind his criticism of
 both orthodoxy and liberalism (Niebuhr, 1935). Niebuhr criticizes Christian ortho-
 doxy for its willingness to accept too much from the ruler or from the government;
 Christian history has often accepted evil rulers as part of God's punishment. But he
 criticizes Christian liberalism as well, for its "sentimental illusions," its "gay and
 easy confidence" and its "perfectionism." The resolution of the problem lies
 somewhere in between - in Christian realism. This realism does not negate the
 importance of individual morality, however.
 14. It is from Donagan that I take the name of this fourth model. He responds
 as well to Brandt, Hare and Nagel. While Donagan's is not an explicitly Christian
 argument, he depends upon the Judaeo-Christian tradition (and specifically upon
 St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant) as part of the background to his writing.
 15. A number of different terms are used to indicate levels of material coopera-
 tion, including also immediate and mediate, positive and negative, etc. Treatments
 of these categories can be found in the works cited above; cf. Dailey, 1970:163-66;
 Davis, 1946:341-52; Koch, 1924:39-46; McHugh and Callan, 1958:615-41.
 16. Dailey, 1970:165. For further examples of cooperation in political activity,
 see McHugh & Callan, 1958:627 (on compromise with opponents) and Koch,
 1924 : 43 (on cooperation with unjust laws). For an excellent contemporary analysis of
 formal and material cooperation, see McCormick, 1984.
 17. I treat these themes in detail in "The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal:
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 Roman Catholic Church-State Theory" (Griffin, 1987). See also Kolbenschlag,
 1985 and 1986.
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